INTRODUCTION

Background
A considerable body of empirical evidence documents the behaviour of calendar anomalies in the US and developed country stock returns. Some studies have shown that returns are higher during the first few trading days of each month. This type of behaviour is consistent with the turn-of-the-month (TOM) effect (see, for instance, McConnell and Xu, 2008; Nikkinen et al., The January effect with respect to returns, on the other hand, is motivated by the tax-loss selling hypothesis. The main idea here is that losses on portfolios are fixed for tax purposes at the end of the financial year (see, for example, Wachtel, 1942; Branch, 1977 , Keim, 1983 Gultekin and Gultekin, 1983; and Ariel, 1987) . Therefore, the premium for small firms in the first few days of the year is a reaction to the tax-selling pressure at the end of the tax year of shares of these firms. 
Motivation
Our aim is to re-examine the impact of January and the TOM on firm returns and firm return volatility for firms listed on the NYSE over the period 05 January 2000 to 31 December 2008. While this is a traditional literature in financial economics, the research gap emanates from the literature's assumption that firms are homogenous. This is relevant because a related branch (see, inter alia, Narayan and Sharma, 2011; Beltratti, 2005; Hanson et al., 2008; and Pennings and Garcia, 2004) of research has demonstrated that firms are heterogeneous.
Previous studies have considered the impact of January and TOM on aggregate returns. We take the position, motivated by the literature that has shown firm heterogeneity, in particular a recent study by Narayan and Sharma (2011) , that if firms are indeed heterogeneous then January and TOM will have different effects on firms depending on their sectoral location as well as on their size. For example, we believe that firms belonging to the financial sector or the banking sector may be differently impacted by January and TOM compared to firms belonging to the agricultural sector or the textiles sector. This is because market structures and trading volume (hence prices) of firms belonging to different sectors are different over time, as has been documented by a large body of market microstructure literature. A recent study on the effect of oil price and firm returns by Narayan and Sharma (2011) finds that oil price has a positive effect on returns for firms belonging to transport and energy sectors and negative effect for firms belonging to other sectors.
We also believe that small size firms maybe differently impacted by TOM and January effects compared to large size firms. This idea is motivated by two sets of studies. First, Narayan and Sharma (2011) show that oil price has a positive effect on firm returns for the smallest sized firms and a negative effect on returns for large sized firms. Second, an influential branch of research (see, inter alia, Froot et al., 1993; Peterson and Rajan, 1995; Vickery, 2008; Moeller et al., 2004) in financial economics has already demonstrated that the behaviour of small size firms differ from the large size firms. In this paper, we, thus, relax the assumption of homogeneity of firms and conduct an analysis of the TOM and January effects on returns relationship for each of the 560 firms listed on the NYSE. We categorise firms into various sectors and sizes to ensure a homogenous grouping of firms.
The second limitation of the literature which motivates us for the present study is that none of the studies have considered the effect of January and TOM on firm return volatility. We believe that if January and TOM impact returns of firms differently, then it should also have a heterogeneous impact on the return volatility of firms. Whether or not this is the case is an empirical issue and has not been investigated to-date. Based on these motivations, we propose to examine three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: that January and TOM affect firm returns differently depending on the sectoral location of firms.
Hypothesis 2: that January and TOM affect firm volatility differently depending on the sectoral location.
Hypothesis 3: that January and TOM affect firm return and firm return volatility differently depending on the firm size.
The balance of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we discuss hypotheses, present the empirical model, and discuss the findings. In the final section, we provide some concluding remarks. Ogden (1990) and Booth et al. (2001) . This hypothesis essentially associates the TOM effect with the nature of market activities, such as payment of wages, dividends, interest, and other liabilities, undertaken towards the end-of-the-month.
HYPOTHESIS, EMPIRICAL MODEL AND MAIN FINDINGS
These activities, argues Ogden (1990) , induce the TOM effect in stock returns. Moreover, Ogden (1990) contends that the monthly and January effects are due, at least in part, to a standardisation in the US payments system, leading to a concentration of cash flows at the turn of each calendar month. The resulting effect is that investors realise significant cash receipts at the TOM. This cash, when reinvested, results in a surge in stock returns at the TOM. Ogden (1990) also introduces the role of monetary policy in inducing TOM effect in stock returns. The main thesis of his argument is that monetary policy, because it affects expected liquid profits, will affect TOM stock returns. The way monetary policy works is as follows. When the monetary policy is relaxed (stringent) it is expected to induce larger (smaller) liquid profits and, thus, larger (smaller) TOM stock returns (see Laurent, 1988 for an excellent discussion). In summary, both Ogden (1990) and Booth et al. (2001) find a relationship between unusually high TOM stock returns and loose monetary policy, and conclude that increased liquidity at the end-of-the-month drives the TOM effect.
The second explanation, proposed by Nikkinen et al. (2007) , is based on the macroeconomic announcement hypothesis. Nikkinen et al. (2007) argue that because major macroeconomic announcements take place in the first half of the month they cause TOM effects. They use three main reasons to support their hypothesis. First, the timing of the scheduled macroeconomic releases is known in advance, thus affecting investors expected risks and hence expected returns, and realised volatilities and returns (see, also Jones et al., 1998) .
Second, important macroeconomic news announcements on particular days of each month, particularly in the first half of the month, are systematically clustered. Bollerslev et al. (2000) show that the macroeconomic news announcements released in the earlier days of the month have the core information content for investors and, therefore, are the most significant news announcements. Third, trading activity around these significant announcements increases as investors' trade according to their judgments before and after the announcements; this boosts liquidity (see, for instance, Chordia et al., 2001; Fleming and Remolona, 1999; and Nofsinger and Prucyk, 2003) .
The third explanation for the TOM effect owes to the work of Thaler (1987) , who argues that the TOM effect is due to "window dressing". The idea behind the window dressing strategy is to improve the appearance of the portfolio/fund performance before presenting it to clients or shareholders. Window dressing results when investment managers sell stocks with large losses and purchase high flying stocks near the end-of-the-month (or before reporting dates).
These securities are then reported as part of the fund's holdings. Performance reports and a list of the holdings in a mutual fund are usually sent to clients every month or every quarter.
Window dressing may make a poorly performing fund appear more attractive. With time, however, the fund's poor performance gets exposed. Since the reporting dates presumably coincide with natural calendar dates, such actions may be related to some of the seasonal price movements, particularly the month-end and TOM effect in stock returns.
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The January effect, on the other hand, is commonly explained by the tax-loss selling hypothesis; for a detailed discussion, see Wachtel (1942); Branch (1977) ; Keim (1983); and Brown et al. (1983a, 1983b) . The hypothesis perceives that the small firm premium in the first few days of the year is a reaction to tax-selling pressure at the end of the tax year of the shares of these firms. This hypothesis maintains that tax laws influence investors' portfolio decisions by encouraging the sale of securities that have experienced recent price declines so that the (short-term) capital loss can be offset against taxable income. Brown et al. (1983b) state that small firm stocks are likely candidates for tax-loss selling since these stocks usually have higher variances of price changes and, therefore, larger probabilities of large price declines. Prominently, the tax-loss argument relies on the assumption that investors' wait until the tax year-end to sell their common stock 'losers'. The heavy selling pressure during this period, it is argued, depresses prices of small firm stocks. The price pressure disappears after the tax year-end and prices rebound to equilibrium levels. As a result, stocks of small firms have large returns at the beginning of the new tax year.
Empirical Model
It is now well known that the OLS-based models using daily data suffer from the problem of heteroskedasticity (see Engle, 1982 and Bollerslev, 1986) . To address this issue, we use a GARCH (1,1) model. The time series regression model to test the January effect is of the following form:
( 1) where is the stock return at time is a dummy variable for the month January (i.e., =1 if observation falls on the month January and zero otherwise); is a parameter to be estimated and is an error term. When is statistically significant, this is an evidence of the January effect.
The time series regression model to test the TOM effect is of the following form:
where is the stock return at time is a TOM dummy variable (i.e., =1 if observation falls on the first few trading days of the first and last week of each month and zero otherwise); is a parameter to be estimated and is an error term. When is statistically significant, this is an evidence of the TOM effect.
The variance equation in models 1-2 is of the following form:
To estimate these models, we use daily returns at aggregate and disaggregate levels. For aggregate data, we use four different measures of returns: value-weighted returns (with and without dividends) and equal-weighted returns (with and without dividends 
Our Findings
The results based on Equations (1)- (2), using aggregate NYSE returns (namely valueweighted returns with and without dividends and equal-weighted returns with and without dividends), are reported in Table 1 . The January effect is negative and statistically insignificant for value-weighted returns with and without dividends, and positive and statistically insignificant for equal-weighted returns with and without dividends. With regard to the TOM effect, we find it to be positive and statistically significant for value-weighted returns (with and without dividends) and equal-weighted returns (with and without dividends). The TOM effect is consistent with previous studies (see, for instance, Ariel, 1987; Cadsby and Ratner, 1992; Ogden, 1990; and Nikkinen et al., 2007) .
INSERT TABLE 1
Having shown that only the TOM affects NYSE returns, we now disaggregate our data by firm and consider TOM and the January effects for 560 firms listed on the NYSE. Table 2 reports results on the effect of January on firm returns. The percentage of firms having a statistically significant January effect on firm returns ranges from 12.5 percent in the case of the energy sector to 39.8 percent in the case of the financial sector. We note that the majority of these firms have a negative and statistically significant January effect on firm returns.
INSERT TABLE 2
The largest negative January effect on firm returns is found for the following sectors: food The main finding of the January effect is that only in the financial sector the majority of firms (28.8 percent of firms) experience a rise in returns in January, whereas in the other 13 sectors firm returns generally decrease in January. Figure 1 makes this trend clear.
Results based on the January effect reveal that sectors are heterogeneous and, therefore, it is not wise to claim that aggregate stock returns in the first few days of the year (January effect)
are due to a tax-loss selling hypothesis. Our results reveal that only firms belonging to the financial sector behave consistent with a tax-loss selling hypothesis. Moreover, it follows that the overall January effect on aggregate stock returns are likely to be a result of the dominance of the financial sector. However, the main aim of previous studies (see, for example, Reinganum, 1983 and Roll, 1983) was to examine the tax-loss selling hypothesis based on firm size and not based on the sectoral belonging of firms.
The results of the TOM effect, based on Equation (2), are reported in Table 3 . We find very strong evidence of the TOM effect on firm returns. The majority of the firm returns are positively affected by the TOM. The financial and real estate sectors show 70 percent of firms having a positive and statistically significant TOM effect on firm returns, followed by chemical sector (57.9 percent of firms), and electricity sector (56.6 percent of firms).
On the other hand, the percentage range of firms with a negative and statistically significant TOM effect on firm returns is from 1.3 percent of firms in the case of the manufacturing sector to 4.3 percent of firms in the case of the real estate sector, which is significantly less than the percentage range of firms having a positive and statistically significant TOM effect on firm returns (see Figure 2) . The key message from this analysis is that the TOM effect has a statistically significant and positive effect on firm returns in the majority of cases. This implies that for the majority of firms, return increases during the first few trading days of the first and last week of the month.
INSERT TABLE 3 INSERT FIGURE 2
There are three key messages emerging from the overall analysis on the January effect and the TOM effect. First, we only find evidence of a statistically significant TOM effect on aggregate stock returns, while the January effect is statistically insignificant. Second, when we use disaggregate firm returns, we find support for our proposed hypothesis that January and the TOM have different effects on different firms depending on their sectoral location.
This implies that the January and TOM effects on firm returns are heterogeneous. Third, we find that whether the sign of these effects is positive or negative depends on the sector to which firms belong to. It also follows that the overall sign effect of the TOM and January effect on aggregate stock returns (as in previous studies cited earlier) are likely to be a result of the dominance of one or few sectors making up the aggregate market. Thus, as our results
show, it is misleading to generalise the effect of January and the TOM on returns based on a regression model consisting of market returns. In our study, we show that a firm level analysis of TOM and January effects on returns reveals different results, not only in terms of sign but also in terms of magnitude.
Hypothesis 2: that TOM and January affect firm volatility differently depending on
sectoral location.
Empirical Model
Our approach to examining the January and the TOM effects in return volatility is the same as examining hypothesis 1. We estimate a GARCH (1,1) model for the four measures of aggregate NYSE return volatility and for each of the 560 firms using daily time series data from 05 January 2000 to 31 December 2008:
The time series regression model to test the January effect on return volatility is of the following form:
where is stock return volatility; is a dummy variable for the month of January (i.e., =1
if observation falls on the month January and zero otherwise); and is a parameter to be estimated.
The time series regression model to test the TOM effect on return volatility is of the following form:
where is stock return volatility; is a TOM dummy variable (i.e., =1 if observation falls on the first few trading days of the first and last week of each month and zero otherwise); and is a parameter to be estimated.
The mean equation for Models 4 and 5 is of the following form:
where is stock returns at time and is an error term. Table 4 reports the results on the TOM and the January effects on aggregate return volatility.
Our Findings
In Equations (4) and (5), we capture volatility of aggregate returns by using value-weighted (with and without dividends) and equal-weighted (with and without dividends) returns. The TOM has a statistically significant and positive effect on aggregate return volatility while January has a negative and statistically significant effect on only equal-weighted return volatility. In sum, this analysis reveals TOM effect on aggregate return volatility.
INSERT TABLE 4
To further explore the January and TOM effect on return volatility, we use return volatility for 560 firms and conduct the analysis for each firm. The results, based on Equation (4), on the January effect are tabulated in Table 5 . The percentage of firms having a statistically significant January effect on firm return volatility ranges from 25 percent in the case of the energy sector to 81.9 percent in the case of the general services sector. We note that except for firms in the real estate sector, all sectors have greater percentage of firms experiencing a positive and statistically significant January effect on firm return volatility.
INSERT TABLE 5
The largest positive January effect on firm volatility is found for the following sectors:
medical (50 percent of firms), computer (47 percent of firms), general services (46 percent of firms), and transportation, engineering, supply, food, banking, chemical, electricity and manufacturing (31-39 percent of firms).
From Figure 3 , which plots the percentage of total significant (both positive and negative) January effects, it is clear that a positive January effect dominates return volatility for 13 of the 14 sectors; the exception being the real estate sector. Our main conclusion from these results is that the January effect is strong for all sectors, and the effect is predominantly positive.
The impact of the TOM on return volatility by sector, based on Equation (5), is reported in Table 6 . We find very strong evidence of the TOM effect on firm return volatility. The percentage of firms with a statistically significant TOM effect on firm return volatility is greater than 50 percent in 13 sectors. The percentage range is from 55.6 percent to 72.6 percent, except in the energy sector where only 47.5 percent of firms experience volatility induced by the TOM.
INSERT TABLE 6
In terms of the sign of the TOM effect, we find that firms belonging to nine sectors -energy, electricity, supply, food, chemical, medical, computer, banking, and real estate -experience a greater positive TOM effect, while the opposite is true for firms belonging to manufacturing, transport, financial, and general services sectors (see Figure 4) .
Hypothesis 3: that TOM and January affect firm returns and firm return volatility
differently based on the firm size.
Our Findings
The first objective here is to examine the effect of the January and TOM on firm returns for different firm sizes. To test this, we divide our sample of firms into four sizes, based on market capitalization; size 1 represents the smallest firms while size 4 represents the largest firms. We run Equations (1)- (2) for each firm in each size category and calculate the percentage of times January and TOM have a statistically significant effect on firm returns in each size category. Table 7 reports results for the January effect based on Equation (1) for the different firm sizes. We notice that as the firm size increases, the positive and statistically significant January effect decreases. In other words, small size firms show greater percentage of positive and statistically significant January effect (18.6 percent of firms) compared to the other three firm sizes. For these three firm sizes, the January effect is mostly negative (16.4-25 percent) compared to the positive effect. Hence, our results support the tax-loss selling hypothesis, which states that small firm stocks posit large returns in the beginning of the new tax year.
INSERT TABLE 7
Next, we report the TOM effect on returns of different firm sizes. The results are presented in Table 8 . We notice that the percentage of firms with a statistically significant positive TOM effect is significantly greater than the negative TOM effect in all four firm sizes. We also note that there is a greater percentage of firms in size 1 (52.9 percent of firms) and in size 2 (61.4 percent of firms) with a statistically significant and positive TOM effect compared to firms in size 3 (40 percent) and firms in size 4 (34.3 percent). The results reveal that returns of small size firms have a greater effect of the TOM compared to large size firms.
INSERT TABLE 8
The second objective is to examine if January and TOM effects on firm return volatility vary with firm size. To test this, we run Equations (4)-(5) for each firm in each size category (size 1 represents smallest firms and size 4 represents the largest firms, as before) and calculate the percentage of times calendar anomalies have a statistically significant positive and negative effect on firm return volatility in each size category.
We estimate the January effect on firm return volatility for the four firm sizes and report the results in Table 9 . The percentage of firms with a statistically significant January effect is greater in small size firms compared to large size firms. There are 53 percent of firms in size 1, 56 percent of firms in size 2, 45 percent of firms in size 3, and 43 percent of firms in size 4 that experience a statistically significant January effect on firm volatility. Another feature of the January effect is that in all four firm sizes the positive January effect is greater than the negative January effect on firm return volatility.
INSERT TABLE 9
Finally, the TOM effects on firm return volatility for each of the four firm sizes are reported in Table 10 . We notice that as the firm size increases the percentage of firms with a statistically significant TOM effect decreases. Around 67 percent of firms in size 1 experience a statistically significant TOM effect on firm return volatility followed by around 68 percent of firms in size 2, 60 percent of firms in size 3, and around 54 percent of firms in INSERT TABLE 10 3.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The literature on calendar anomalies and stock returns is large. However, none of the studies have examined this relationship at the firm level. Our study is the first to undertake a detailed firm level analysis of the TOM and January effects on firm returns and firm return volatility.
Our empirical analysis is based on 560 firms listed on the NYSE. In this study, we propose and test three hypotheses: (1) that TOM and January affect firm returns differently depending on their sectoral location; (2) that TOM and January affect firm return volatility differently depending on their sectoral location; and (3) that TOM and January affect firm returns and firm return volatility differently based on firm size.
We unravel three main findings. First, we find that TOM and January affect firm returns differently depending on the sector to which firms belong to. The January effect on firm returns is mostly positive in the financial sector, while in the other 13 sectors the January effect is highly negative. There is strong evidence of the TOM effect on firm returns for firms in all 14 sectors.
Second, most of the firms in all 14 sectors experience greater cases of a positive and statistically significant January and TOM effects on firm return volatility. It is also worth highlighting that the January effect is mostly negative in the case of firm returns and positive in the case of firm return volatility, whereas the TOM effect is mostly positive in the case of firm returns and it remains positive in the case of return volatility for firms belonging to the following sectors: energy, electricity, supply, food, chemical, computer, banking, and real estate sectors. Thus, these findings reveal that TOM and January have a heterogeneous effect on firm returns and firm volatility.
Finally, we find that the impact of January and TOM on firm returns and firm return volatility of small size firms is greater than for large firms. This implies that January and TOM effects are size dependent for firms listed on the NYSE. In closing, it should be noted that the three main findings of this study were previously unknown. The strong implication emerging from this study is that one should be extremely careful on the sector to which firms belong to and on the size of firms when testing financial market-based hypotheses that are likely to be dependent on firm homogeneity. In this regard, our warning here is similar to that of Narayan . In all these models represents returns; represents TOM and January dummy variables, respectively. We report probability of coefficients in parenthesis. * and ** denote statistically significance at 5% and 10 % levels, respectively. . All variables are defined in Table 1 . 'sig+' is the number and percentage (in parenthesis) of positive and statistically significant coefficients. 'sig-' is the number and percentage (in parenthesis) of negative and statistically significant coefficients. 'insig+' is the number and percentage (in parenthesis) of positive and statistically insignificant coefficients. 'insig-' is the number and percentage (in parenthesis) of negative and statistically insignificant coefficients. . The variables are defined in Table 1 . 'sig+' is the number and percentage (in parenthesis) of positive and statistically significant coefficients. 'sig-' is the number and percentage (in parenthesis) of negative and statistically significant coefficients. 'insig+' is the number and percentage (in parenthesis) of positive and statistically insignificant coefficients. 'insig-' is the number and percentage (in parenthesis) of negative and statistically insignificant coefficients. . In all these models represents return volatility;
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represents TOM and January dummy variables, respectively. We report probability of coefficients in parenthesis, * and ** denote statistically significance at 1% and 10% levels, respectively. The mean equation has the following form:
, where is stock returns and is an error term. In this table, we present the estimation results of the TOM effect on firm return for each of the four sizes of firms. A total of 560 firms listed on the NYSE over the period 1 January 1998 to 31 December 2008 are categorized into four sizes. Size quintiles are based on market capitalization at the beginning of the sample period. The results are based on the following GARCH (1,1) model:
. Variables are defined in Table 1 . 'sig+' is the number and percentage (in parenthesis) of positive and statistically significant coefficients. 'sig-' is the number and percentage (in parenthesis) of negative and statistically significant coefficients. 'insig+' is the number and percentage (in parenthesis) of positive and statistically insignificant coefficients. 'insig-' is the number and percentage (in parenthesis) of negative and statistically insignificant coefficients. In this table, we present results of the January effect on firm return volatility for each of the four sizes of firms. A total of 560 firms listed on the NYSE over the period 1 January 1998 to 31 December 2008 are categorized into four sizes. Size quintiles are based on market capitalization at the beginning of the sample period. The results are based on the following GARCH (1,1) variance equation:
. Variables and mean equation are defined in Table 4 . 'sig+' is the number and percentage (in parenthesis) of positive and significant coefficients. 'sig-' is the number and percentage (in parenthesis) of negative and statistically significant coefficients. 'insig+' is the number and percentage (in parenthesis) of positive and statistically insignificant coefficients. 'insig-' is the number and percentage (in parenthesis) of negative and statistically insignificant coefficients. Table 4 . 'sig+' is the number and percentage (in parenthesis) of positive and significant coefficients. 'sig-' is the number and percentage (in parenthesis) of negative and significant coefficients. 'insig+' is the number and percentage (in parenthesis) of positive and insignificant coefficients. 'insig-' is the number and percentage (in parenthesis) of negative and insignificant coefficients. 
